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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-
LACK OF SCIENTER ELEMENT IN CITY ORDINANCE
AGAINST OBSCENITY VIOLATES FIRST
AMENDMENT
The United States Supreme Court in a recent decision'
has beaten back an attempt by the City of Los Angeles to place
new fetters on the free speech guaranties of the First Amend-
ment. The city passed an ordinance2 making it unlawful for
anyone to have in his possession any obscene or indecent book
in any place of business where books were sold or kept for sale.
Appellant, a bookseller, was prosecuted under the ordinance.
He objected to its constitutionality on the ground that it was
an imposition of strict liability with no requirement of scienter.
Therefore a bookseller could be convicted with no showing on
the part of the prosecution of knowledge that the material
in his possession was in fact obscene. The Superior Court for
Los Angeles County affirmed conviction3 on the ground that
the municipality had the right to pass such restrictive legislation
since "the United States Supreme Court has held that obscenity
is not within the area of constitutionally protected free speech
or press."4 The court felt the book concerned in the prosecu-
tion was obscene by any test hence appellant was without a
valid constitutional argument since he was not selling protected
material. In upholding the ordinance the Los Angeles court
recognized that it did not require knowledge or scienter on the
part of the bookseller. This, the court said, did not put the
ordinance in conflict with the state obscenity statutes (which
required a showing of "willful and unlawful" possession with
"lewd" intent). 6 The City ordinance, not being in conflict
with the statute need not yield to its supremacy. The court
said the ordinance merely went one step further than the
statute withdrawing the element of scienter. The court felt that
I Smith v. California, 358 U. S. 926, 80 S. Ct. 215, 3 L. Ed. 2nd 299 (1959).
2 Los Angeles, Municipal Code No. 41.01.1.
3 161 Cal. App. 2d 860, 327 P. 2d 636 (1958).
4 Roth v. United States, Alberts v. California, two cases, 354 U.S. 476, at 485
(1957).
5 Cal. Penal Code Ann. No. 311 (West, 1955).
6 People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 959, 178 P. 2d 853 (1947).
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the city, acting within the scope of its police power, had a right
to protect its citizens against the sale of articles dangerous or
deleterious to the public or contrary to public morals. Ordi-
nances basing conviction upon possession alone, without more,
of other such dangerous articles have been held constitutional.
Therefore said the court, "So with books."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari reversing the con-
viction with four justices concurring and one dissenting in
part. 7 The court felt the ordinance, in excluding a requirement
of mens rea, was unduly restrictive and was unconstitutional
because of its tendency to inhibit free speech. 8
The Supreme Court has made it clear from the first that the
Constitution does not compel so high a value to be placed on
freedom of expression that it can never be subordinated to
other interests. 9 The doctrine that obscenity is outside the
free speech protection of the First Amendment is first dis-
cernible in Near v. Minnesota. JLo This dictum was expanded
further in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire" and Beauharnais v.
Illinois. 12 The most recent restatement took place in Roth v.
United States" where the majority after a historical approach
concluded; ". . . it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing
of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every
utterance... At the time of the adoption of the First Amend-
ment obscenity law was not as fully developed as libel law but
there is sufficiently contemporaneous evidence to show that
obscenity too, was outside the protection intended for free
7 Smith v. California, supra note 1.
8 The basis of jurisdiction for the federal court ruling on the local ordinance here
is the principle, assumed as correct by the majority of the court, that the
Fourteenth Amendment applies the restrictions of the First with equal force
against the states. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1924), and Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
9 Richardson, "Freedom of Expression and the Function of the Courts." 65 Harv.
L. Rev. 1 (1951).
10 283 U. S. 697 (1930). At page 714 the court said, "No one would question but
that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting or the
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location
of troops. On similar grounds the primary requirements of decency may be
enforced against obscene publications."
11 315 U.S. 568 (1941).
12 343 U.S. 250 (1951).
13 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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speech and press."14 This series of decisions would seem
to have settled the principle that obscenity, as such, is outside
the protection of the First Amendment. The problem lies in
dealing with what is not obviously obscene and even with the
definition of the word itself.' 5 It is in this twilight zone that
the conflict arises as to whether the court will balance the
interests involved or treat the words of the First Amendment as
imparting absolute protection to free speech. The test used in
determining whether freedom of expression must be weighed in
relation to more important interests has been that of "dear
and present danger."' 6 The Court in Dennis v. United States
adopted Judge Learned Hand's interpretation of the Test:
"In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the evil
discounted by its improbability justifies the invasion of free
speech as is necesary to avoid the danger."17 In a separate
concurring opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter said, "The demands
of a free speech in a democratic society... are better served by a
candid and informed weighing of the competing interests,
within the confines of the judicial process...-18 However the
"dear and present danger" formula is difficult to apply to
freedom of speech cases outside of the overthrow of govern-
ment situations as presented in the Dennis case. Some dangers
less grave than overthrow of the government by force and
violence are concededly of a sufficient seriousness to warrant
the restriction of free speech. 19 In this light the balancing
of interests advocated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter makes good
sense. Indeed, the court has moved in that direction and
away from "dear and present danger" in recent cases. In
Beauharnais v. Illinois the court found "dear and present
danger" not applicable to libelous utterances. In addition
there was dictum to the effect that obscenity was a class of
14 Id., at 483.
15 See Lockhart and McClure, "Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Con-
stitution." 38 Minn. L. Rev. 295 (1954). At 323 the authors state: "The law of
obscenity undertakes to protect a common standard in an area where there is
no such thing for each community is divided into groups that have different
standards of decency."
16 Mendelson, "Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck To Dennis." 52 Col.
L. Rev. 313 (1952).
17 341 U.S. 494, at 510 (1951).
18 Id., 524-525.
19 51 Col. L. Rev. 98, at 105 (1951).
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speech to which the test did not apply. 2 o The dictum in
Beauharnais was picked up in the majority opinion in Roth v.
United States.2 1 On the basis of these cases it is probably
safe to assume as a settled principle that the "clear and present
danger" test will no longer be used in deciding obscenity
cases.
In Roth the court recognized in obscenity a social problem
on one hand and the necessity for safeguarding the protection
of freedom of speech and press on the other. The majority felt
that constitutional protection should not extend beyond
the point where the average person applying contemporary
community standards feels the dominant theme of the material,
taken as a whole, appeals to a prurient interest. 2 2 The Smith
case under discussion here balances the interest of the com-
munity in having an ordinance controlling obscenity, against
the harm done to the First Amendment freedoms through the
lack of a scienter element. In this light the case is a logical step
by the court toward continued use of the balancing of com-
peting interests formula in construing obscenity statutes. When
the obscenity of the material involved is also an issue the
"prurient interest" test is applied to it. 2 3
The decisions in freedom of expression cases in which the
court attempts to balance the interests are not without strong
dissents. This is especially true in the obscenity cases. Justices
Black and Douglas concurred in a strong rejection of the courts
balancing of the interests in Roth. The opinion, written by
Black, said, "I reject too the implication that problems of
freedom of speech and of the press are to be resolved by weigh-
ing against the values of free expression... The First Amend-
ment, its prohibition in terms absolute was designed to preclude
courts as well as legislatures from weighing the values of free
20 343 U.S. 250, at 266 (1951).
21 354 U.S. 476, at 486-487 (1957).
22 Id., at 514.
23 Some writers believe the value of any test used to ban obscene material is of
little value especially when incorporated into legislation. It is argued that the
recognition of the constitutional issue and review by the courts of each work
on its merits, taking into account all of the broader policy issues will insure
a more intelligent and carefully weighed determination than can be made by
police officers or other equally unqualified censors. See Lockhart and McClure,
supra note 14 at 388.
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speech against silence. The first Amendment puts free speech
in a preferred position."24 Mr. Justice Douglas, while con-
curring with the majority in the Smith decision, indicated that
he differed with their philosophy as to the extent one can be
punished under the Bill of Rights for publishing or distributing
obscenity. The grounds for suppression of free expression are
very narrow, Douglas feels. He rejects the fluid tests of ob-
scenity which prevail, "For the test that suppresses a cheap tract
today can suppress a literary gem tomorrow." 2 Dissents
such as these have their value in keeping the court appraised of
its role as guardian of Constitutional rights when it is tempted
go too far in balancing the interests.
A further conflict in the court arises as to the extent to which
the Federal Constitution prohibits state regulation of freedom
of expression. This is important in the Smith case because of
prior holdings by the Supreme Court that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies all of the force of the First against the
states. 2 6 Certain of the Justices feel that the First Amendment
should not apply as strictly to the states. Mr. Justice Jackson
in Beauharnais v. Illinois pointed out the weakness of a single
standard to both federal and state action in this field. 2 7 The
Federal government has very limited authority to weigh the
maintenance of free speech against social interests favoring
suppression. The First amendment strongly inhibits any federal
action along this line. States, on the other hand, have different
functions and duties in relation to the freedoms of speech and
press. Consequently states should be permitted greater latitude
in controlling free speech when they consider other social
interests more important. Mr. Justice Harlan in the Roth case
adopted this view and also pointed out that, ". . . the dangers
of federal censorship in this field are far greater than anything
the states may do." 28 In the instant case Harlan again brought
out this principle in his partial dissent. He contended that the
court needed more information than it had before striking
24 Roth v. United States, supra note 4 at 514.
25 Smith v. United States, supra note 1 at 226-227.
26 Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943).
27 343 U.S. 250, at 294-295 (1951).
28 Roth v. United States, supra note 4 at 505.
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down the ordinance as unconstitutional. Different considera-
tions are involved depending on whether a state or federal
statute is before the court. If states have greater scope than
the federal government in barring material as obscene then
the court should remand the case for a further showing by
the city of necessity for such an ordinance. Harlan implies
that he would consider an adequate showing of sufficient
public need justification for upholding the constitutionality
of the ordinance. Even though its effect might be to induce
booksellers to restrict their offerings of non-obscene literary
merchandise for fear of unwittingly having on their shelves
an obscene publication, Harlan feels a state may constitu-
tionally do this to protect its citizens against the dissemination
of obscene material.
The entire field of obscenity regulation involves the draw-
ing of fine lines, the setting of delicate balances, and the laying
of flexible boundaries. A legal line must be drawn between
decency and indeceny. 2 9 A balance must be struck between
the community's need for regulation of obscenity and the
continuance of freedom of expression. And finally the dif-
ference in scope between state and federal power to legislate
against it must be determined. All of these factors must be
considered by legislators in devising statutes and the courts in
interpreting them. The role of the Supreme Court is to in-
dicate to these bodies the boundary points of the territory
covered by the First Amendment freedoms, beyond which
they must not trespass in pursuing their respective social
needs. One of those points is defined dearly by the decision
in the instant case.
D. A. B.
29 Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, 531-535 (1941).
DOMESTIC RELATIONS, DIVORCE, RETROACTIVE
MODIFICATION OF ACCRUED ALIMONY
A recent Nebraska decision, Rhuehle v. Rhuehle, serves
as a competent guide in examining the question of the ability
of the courts to retroactively modify accrued installments of
alimony. I This was an action by a wife to recover the amount
I Rhuehle v. Rhuehle, 169 Neb. 23, 97 N.W. 2d 868 (1959); See Rhuehle v.
Rhuehle, 161 Neb. 691, 74 N.W. 2d 690, (1956).
